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Making restructured sovereign debt obligations  the price of oil rises above $14 per barrel (ad-
contingent on exogenous factors (such as world  justed for U.S. inflation) will accrue to the banks
oil prices) allows some of the risk to be trans-  that have granted debt service relief.  (This
ferred to creditors who have comparative advan-  amount is not to exceed 3 percent of the nominal
tage in carrying the risks - as they can diversify  value of the debt exchanged for these bonds, in
them in capital markets.  any year.) The value of the recapture clause at
maturity depends on three variables:  how much
Contingencies also increase the borrowers'  oil Mexico exports, how oil prices behave, and
likelihood of fulfilling their (new or restructured)  the behavior of inflation rates.
extemal obligations - and can improve the
heavily indebted countries' incentives to invest  Export volume is not a factor in Venezuela's
and adjust, increasing further the likelihood they  1990 recapture clause, which in other ways is
will service their extemal obligations.  similar to Mexico's.
The  1986 agreement between Mexico and  Claessens and van Wijnbergen develop
commercial banks included some contingency  pricing models for opt;ons written on average
facilities where new money would be forthcom-  prices and contingent contracts used in sovereign
ing if intemational oil priecs fell below a certain  debt restructuring. They use the models to price
level or when Mexico's growth rate was to fall  the recapture clauses in the 1990 Mexican and
short of a certain rate. In the 1990 Mexico and  Venezuelan debt restructuring agreements.
Venezuela agreements, future debt service
obligations  were indexed to factors largely  The current values of the recapture clauses
exogenous to the countries - the so-called  are less than one-quarter of the maximum
recapture clauses.  contractually possible and decrease as the
standard deviation of the oil price increases.
Under the recapture clause in Mexico, 30
percent of the extra oil revenues Mexico gets if
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I. Introduction
It  has long  been  recognized  that  debt  obligations  and  provisions  of nei
financing  which  are  contingent  with  respect  to  a set  of exogenous  factors  can
play  a  useful  role  in  international  finance  for  developing  countries.  Making  debt
obligations  contingent  on some exogenous  factors  can allow for not only a
transfers  of  risk  to  the  creditors  which  have  comparative  advantage  in  carrying
theoo  risks (as they can diversify  these  risks  in the international  capital
markets),  but  also  for  a  greater  likelihood  of  a  borrower  fulfilling  his (new  or
restructured)  external  obligations.  For  a  heavily  indebted  country,  contingencies
car  further  improve  the  country's  incentives  to  invest  and  adjust,  leading  to  a
higher  likelihood  of servicing  its  external  obligations.
The  1986  agreement  between  Mexico  and  its  commercial  banks  included  some
contingency  facilities  where  new  money  would  be  forthcoming  in  case  international
oil  prices  fell  belod  a  certain  level  or  when  Mexico's  growth  rate  was to  fall
short of a certain rate. Contingencies  in the context of debt reduction
agreements,  where  future  reduced  debt  obligations  are indexed  with respect  to
factors  (largely)  exogenous  to  the  country,  were  for  the  first  time  used  in the
1990 Mexico agreement  (the so-called  recapture  clause).  The 1990 Venezuela
agreement  incorporates  a similar  recapture  clause.'  Other contingencies  have
been  introduced  irn  international  finance  through  commodity  bonds,  which  have  been
used  on a larger  scale  in  recent  years.
The  pricing  of  contingent  contracts  has  been  widely  studied  in  the  field
of finance,  where the payoff  structure  of so-called  derivative  assets  often
depend  on  the  behavior  of  an  underlying  state  variable.  The  methodology  developed
in finance  has however  not seen an empirical  application  to the pricing  of
contingencies  (recapture  clauses)  in inter-national  debt contracts.  To  the
contrary,  many  times,  methods  useful  in  certainty  frameworks  have  been  applied
to  value  contracts  in  international  finance  with  contingency  features.  This  note
bridges  the gap and  presents  a simple  methodology  to price  contingencies  in
international  finance  with  a  particular  application  to  the  recapture  clauses  in
the  1990  Mexico  and 1990  Venezuela  agreements.
II.  Pricing  Debt  Claims  and  Recapture  Clauses
We  first  develop  a  general  model  of  pricing  of  a  commercial  bank  debt  claim
on a country using option pricing.  2/  The setup is the following.  Due to
uncertainty  in  the  country's  export  earnings,  import  requirements  and  net  capital
in-or  outflows,  the  net  amount  of financing  available  each period  to service
'These  recapture  clauses  were  written,  however,  for  up-side  contingencies.
Other  clauses  (for  new  financing)  were  intended  to  be  included  in  the  1990  Mexico
agreement  for  downside  contingencies,  but  never  materialized.
2For  a further  description  of the  option  pricing  methodology  see  Claessens
and  van  Wijnbergen  (1989).3
foreign  commerciai  debt  is  uncertain. 3/ Each  period  the  country  pays  as  much  as
its  financial  resources  allow  to the  commercial  banks,  but  never  more than  its
contractual  obligations  in  the  period.  Consequently,  repayments  may fall  short
of commercial  debt  service  obligations  due.
We can  represent  this  repayment  behavior  by the  following:
(la) R'(t)-  min [Rt,FXl]
with  R'(t)  equal  to the  repayment  in  period  t;  Rt  the  contractual  debt  service
in  period  t;  and  FXt  the  resources  available  to  service  commercially  held  debt,
all in  period  t. (la)  can  be rearranged  to  yield:
(lb) R^(t)  -Rt  - max[O,Rt  - FXMt
But  max[O,Rt  - FXtj  equals  the  payoff  at maturity  of a (European)  put,  with  a
strike  price of Rt,  which is written  on the value of the foreign  exchange
available,  FXt.  '/  Thus equation  lb shows  that  the  uncertain  repayment  can  be
represented  by a certain  repayment  Rt  minus  a put,  with a strike  price  of Rt,
which  is  written  on the  value  of the  foreign  exchange  available,  FXt.
Now  that  we have  replicated  the  payoff  stream,  it  is  easy  to  calculate  the
current  value  of the  uncertain  payoff  stream  as the  current  value  of  the  certain
future  obligation  Rt  minus  the  current  value  of the  put.  This  current  value  of
the  uncertain  payoff  stream  equals  thus  the  discounted  value  of  Rt,  exp(-rt)*Rt
(where  r is the (continuously  compounding)  interest  rate),  minus the  current
3The uncertainty  in the amount of resources  used to  service  foreign
obligations  can  be due  to  ability  to  pay  as  well  as  willingness  to  pay  factors.
For  convenience,  we lump  these  factors  together  and  assume  that  the  creditors
have  appropriability  of  any  resources  falling  short  of  contractual  debt  service,
or,  alternati-.-ely  and  equivalently,  that  the  country  is  a  perfectly  willing,  but
sometimes  unable  payer.
'  The  state  variable  FX is  a  non-traded  asset  and  not  as  such  priced  in  the
market.  But  if  the  state  variable  is  spanned  by  other  traded  instru&-tnts,  one  can
price  the  non-traded  asset  and  all  results  go  through  identically  as  in  the  case
of traded  assets.  See  also  section  III.  By  defining  the  repayment  behavior  in
period  t  as in  equation  la,  we  have implicitly  made  the  assumption  that  claims
which  are  not  met  in  previous  periods  will  not  be  added  on (rescheduled)  to  the
stock  of  claims  already  outstanding.  This  contrasts  with  Kharas  et all.  (1987),
Cohen  (1989)  a-id  Dixit  and  Bartolini  (1990)  who  assume  that  all  unpaid  claims  are
always  rescheduled.  The reality  is between  theirs  and our extremes:  not all
unpaid  debt  will  be rescheduled  at  original  terms  and  some  may  be forgiven.  The
assumption  we  made  that  unmet  claims  are  not  carried  over  was  with  the  numerical
application  in  mind.4
value  P  of  a  put  with  an exercise  price  of  Rt,  written  on  FXt.  5/  If  V(Rt)  is  the
prcsent  value  of the  claim,  we can  represent  this  as:
(2)  V(Rt)  - exp(-rt)*Rt  - P(FXt,Rt,r,z,o).
where  P(FXt,Rt,r,t,a)  is  the  current  value  of a  put  written  on FXW  with  exercise
pricL  Rt,  interest  rate  r,  maturity  t  and  standard  deviation  of FX  of  a.  If  one
furthermore  assumes  that  FX  behaves  lognormally,  the  pricing  of the  put can  be
done  using  the  Black  and  Scholes  option  pricing  formula  (see  Black  and  Scholes
(1973)).  6/  p is  then  equal  to the  following  expression:
(3)  P(FXt,Rt,r,t,o)  - - FX0*exp((p-r)t)*N(dl)  +  exp(-rt)R*N(d2)
where
dl - [-log(FX 0*exp(pt)/Rt)  - (o2/2)*t]/(ajt)
d2 - dl +  aJt
p  - the  drift  in  FX,  over  the  period  O..t 7/
The  option  pricing  methodology  can  also  be  used  to  price  recapture  clauses,
where  the  future  payments  obligations  of the  country  are  in  some  fashion  indexed
to the amount  of foreign  exchange  available  in a particular  period.  Take the
following  recapture  clause (which  is similar  to the one of the 1990 Mexico
5  The  formula  assumes  a  constant  interest  rate  r  for  notational  convenience
only.  The empirical  application  presented  below  allows  for  different  maturity
structures  of interest  rates.
6  Other density  functions  can easily  be incorporated  using numerical
integration  techniques.
7  The  formula  assumes  a constant  drift  p  for  notational  convenience  only.
The  empirical  application  presented  below  allows  for  time  varying  drift  parameter
p. "The  valuation  formula  differs  from  the  Black-Scholes  equation  in  that  we do
not  assume  p-r.  The  valuation  formula  we use  is  the-:efore  closer  to  the  pricing
of  a  commodity  option  written  on  the  futures  prices  of  the  underlying  commodity.
Black  (1976,  page 177)  shows  that  the  value  of such  a  commodity  option  written
on  the  futures  price  can  be  obtained  from  the  original  Black  and  Scholes  formula
by substituting  xertt  for  x everywhere  in the  original  formula,  where  x stands
for the  futures  price.  In the  application  here  we use the time-varying  drift
parameter  p to incorporate  the  deviation  of the  futures  price  at  each  maturity
date  from  the  current  spot  price.  In this  way,  we  model  a forward  curve  of the
net  amount  of foreign  financing  available  to  service  commercial  bank  debt,  and
thus  a forward  (or  futures)  oil  pricing  curve.  Historically,  the  forward  yield
curve  for  oil  has  been  upward  sloping  with  a  slope  less  than  the  nominal  interest
rate.  This  is  due  to,  among  others,  the  relative  levels  of  convenience  yields  and
carrying  costs.  In  the  application  here,  this  would  imply  that  A is less  than  r
for  each  period.  Forward  prices  are  now  avalable  for  approximately  10-15  years.
The volatility  of futures  (or forward)  oil prices  is of the same order  of
magnitude  as the  volatility  of spot  oil  prices.5
agreement).  Assume, that the -Lause stipulates  that the creditors dre entitled
(in  exchange  for  a certain  amount  of debt reduction  at time  zero  or for an  amount
of cash), whenever foreign exchange exceeds a certain level L, to a share a  of
the  excess toreign  exchange  over  L in  every  period after time  r  up to  time  T. The
maximum  amount that creditors  can receive per  period under this sharing rule is
limited  by an amount M. 8/
Such  a  sharing  rule  can  easily  be  represented  in  terms  of  option
terminology: the creditors hold a fraction a of a series of calls that are
w-itten  on FX  with  exercise  prices  L,  maturity  dates  r+l, r+2,  . . ,T,  and  are short
a fraction a of a series of calls that are written on FX with exercise price
U=L+M-/a  and maturity dates r+l, r+2,..,T.
To  see the equivalence between the sharing rule and the portfolio of
options just described,  consider the payoff  structure for the recapture clause,
which we call I.
(4)  I  - Z,  ,>  max[amax[FX(,)-L,O],M]
- ETto  a*(max[FX( 1.,)-L,O]  - max[FX(,.-U,O]);  U-L+M/a
The  expressions in  the  two  brackets in  the  last  equation  are the  two  calls
mentioned  above,  with exercise  prices  L and U=L+M/a. It  can  be verified that  the
two  calls  yield the  desired  payoff function,  I,  =  max[amax[FX(,,)-L,O],M].  Holding
long  a fraction  a of the first  call pays  amax[FX,-L,O> whenever FX,  falls below
Rt, the call is out of the money and its value is eaual to 0; and whenever FX,
is above L, the call is in the money and thus pays a(FXt  - '). 3eing short a
fraction  a of the second call  pays - amax[FXt  - U,O]. The difference  between the
payoff of the  two calls is thus  the payoff  of the recapture  clause.  The value of
the  two  individual  calls  can  easily  be  calculated  using  option  pricing
techniques, in particular the Black-Scholes  formula.
We can also represent this equivalency  graphically.  Figure 1 shows  on the
horizontal  axis the  value of the  foreign  exchange  available  at  maturity date and
on the vertical axis payoffs for the two calls and the recapture clause. The
figure has three lines which have a slope of one, that represent the payoff
functions of respectively holding long a call with exercise price L ("long"),
holding long a call with exercise  price  U, and, its  mirror image,  being short  a
call  with  exercise  price  U  ("short). In  addition, a  line  with  slope  a,
intersected  by two  horizontal lines  at values 0 and M, is drawn. The difference
between the fraction  a  of the  payoff of the long  call and the fraction  a of the
payoff of the short call is thus represented  by the segment of the line with
slope a between the points (L,O) and (U,M)  and is equal to the payoff of the
recapture  clause for  a given  FX  at the  maturity  date.  As will  be clear,  the  value
of the recapture  clause--the (probability  weighted) shaded area-will  depend on
the probability density of FX over the segment between L and U.
8  L, M and a can be made time dependent. In addition, L, M and a can be
made dependent on other stochastic  variables, such as world inflation  rates in
case of indexed clauses (see the appl.ication  below).6
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Figure 1
In  general,  recapture  clauses  which  depend in  a  more complicated  manner on
FX can also  be handled using option  pricing methodology.  One complication  which
is common  to both  the Venezuela  and Mexico  recapture clause  is  that  the
underlying state variable is not the spot (oil)  price at the maturity date, an
asset price similar to a stock price used for standard option pricing, but
instead a flow measure, involving  an average (of a price) over a certain time
period. 9/  For this reason, we will develop here a gen-al  pricing formula for
options  which are written on the  average of  a state  var.  a  and use this in  the
applications for Mexico and Venezuela.
Consider an European-style call option  (i.e., an option which is only
exercisable at the maturity date) with maturity date T and with exercise price
X, which is written on the average of the price St over the time 'nterval [T-
;,T],  where the average price is calculated  using  very high frequency (infinite
number of)  observations.  At time  T-1, the spot  price ST_1 will of course  be known
with certainty, and the value of the option will depend only on the expected
average  price over the  period [T-1,T]  (and  of course other  inputs for the  option
price  sLch  as the  interest  rate  and the  exercise  price). If the  parameters of  the
stochastic  process of S  over  period [T-1,T]  are known,  then it  will  be clear  that
the expectation  of the average price over [T-1,T],  call it  AT- 1, given ST-1 will
9We will see in the two applications that the average involved either the
(average) foreign exchange earnings over the preceding 12 months--in case of
Mexico--or the averaga  price received  over the preceding six months--in  case of
Venezuela.7
not be stochastic. 10/ At time  T-1, there  will  be no instantaneous  uncertainty
about  AT-, and  the  value  of the  option  will  therefore  be known  with  certainty.
As time  goes  on,  more  will  be known  about  the  average  price  as observations  on
S will  come  in-  which  will  of course  be reflected  in  the  price  of the  option,
but instantaneously  the  drift  in  A and  the  option  price  is  known.
In case the price process  S has a lognormal  distribution  with drift
parameter  1&, the  expected  average  price  over  period  [T-l,T]  will  just  be:
(4)  AS-1  - ST-.*[exp(s(T-(T-l)))-l]/ 1s - ST_1*[eXP(/)-']/H-1/
The  value  of a call  option  written  on the  average  price  with  an exercise
price  X at time  T-1,  call  it  Z(AT-1,T-l),  will  then  be:
(5)  Z(AT-1,T-l)  - exp(-r(T-(T-l))*max[ST_1*[exp(u)-l1/p-X,O].
Notice  that  this  equation  does  not involve  taken  any  expected  values.  Equation
(5)  can  be rewritten,  by  bringing  a factor  outside  the  max-operator,  as:
(5')  Z(AT- 1 ,T-l)  - max(Sl-,p/1exp(p)-l]*X,O]*[exp(p)  l]/p*exp(-r)
Eauation  (5')  shows  that  the  value  at time  T-1  of  an  European  call  option
written  on the average  price  over period  [T-1,T],  is equal  to the  payoff  at
maturity  of  a  European  call  option  written  on  ST_1 with  exercise  price  A/[exp(p)-
1]*X  and  maturity  date  T-1,  multiplied  by  the  factor  exp(-r)*[exp(p)-l]/p.  At  any
time  t  before  T-1,  we  can  use  normal  option  pricing  techniques  to  price  this  last
option  by just  specifying  the  correct  exercise  price  and  maturity  date.  Similar
to  equation  (3),  the  value  of the  call  option  on the  average  price  over (T-1,T]
at time  0 for  the  lognormal  distribution  can  thus  be expressed  as,
(6)  Z(S 0,X,r,t,a)  - [(exp(p)-l)/]*(So*exp(p*(T-l)-rT)*N(dl)  -
exp(-rT)*X*(p/[exp(p)-l])*N(d2))
- (So*exp(p*(T-l)-rT)*N(dl))*[exp(p)-l]/p  -
exp(-rT)*X*N(d2)
where  dl  - [log(So*exp(p(T-l))/(X*exp(-r(T-l)*p/[exp(p)-l]))
10Formally,  giving  the law  of large  numbers,  we know that the  drift  in  A
wi'l  be:  dAt  - Stdt  (t<T),  which  is  not  stochastic.  (The  drift  ir  S itself  will
of  course  be  stochastic.)  There  is  no  instantaneous  uncertainty  ir.  At,  the  option
will thus not need to hedged  by "positions"  in S, and its price will be
independent  of the  uncertainty  (standard  deviation)  of S.
"At time  t (T-l<t<T)  the  expectation  of the  average  price  over  the  period
[T-l,T]  will  be the  average  price  up to  t (scaled  cown),  At*(t-(T-l)),  plus  the
expectation  of  the  expected  average  price  over  the  remaining  period,  St*[exp(p(T-
t)  -1  ]/.8
+  (02/2)*(T-l)]/(a|(T-l))
d2  - dl - (o2/2)*(T-l)]/(aJ(T-l))
The  closed  form  solution  for  the  value  of an  option  on the  average  price
allows  us to check  the  commonly  made  assertion  e-hat  options  written  on average
prices  are  lower  valued  than  options  written  on end  of period  (maturity  date)
prices  of the same  asset  because  option  values  a-e an increasing  function  of
volatility  and  the  volatility  of the  average  price  is  less  than  the  volatility
of the spot price.  Comparing  equation  (6)  with the formula  for a standard
European  call  option  on  the  spot  price  with  maturity  T  would  allow  us to  verify
this  assertion.  A  standard  European  call  option  on  the  spot  price  at  time  T  would
be priced  as:
(7)  C(St,X.r,t,a)  - So*exp((p-r)T)*N(dl)  - exp(-rT)X*N(d2)
where  dl  - (log(SO*exp(juT))/X)  +  (o 2/2)*T]/(aJT)
d2  - dl  - (0 2/2)*T]/koraT)
Comparing  equation  (6)  and  (7),  and  using  the  standard  partial  derivatives
for  the  Black-Scholes  option  pricing  formula,  we  find  the  following  factors  which
will lead  to a  difference  between  the  value  of an  option  on the  average  and  an
option  written  on the  end  of  period  price.  The  factor  [exp(p)-l]/p  (multiplying
the  option  value)  is  larger  than  one  and  will  therefore  increase  the  value  of  Z
relative  to C. The  exercise  price  is lower  for  Z (by  the  factor  p/[exp(p)-l])
which  will increase  the  value  of Z relative  to C. And the  maturity  for Z is
shorter  which  will  lower  the  value  of Z relative  to C.  The  net  effect  of these
three  factors  will  be  unclear. 12/
III.  The  Mexico  1990  Recapture  Clauses  and  the  Behavior  of Oil  Prices
The  exact  formulation  of  the  recapture  clause  in  the  Mexico  agreement  was
as  follows.  Banks  choosing  the  debt  relief  options  in  the  agreement  are  eligible
for  recovering  some  of  the  money  given  through  a  recapture  clause.  Under  this
clause,  beginning  July  1996,  30%  of r'e  extra  oil  revenues  Mexico  gets if the
price  of  oil  rises  above  $14  per  barrel  (adjusted  for  US  inflation),  will  accrue
co  the  banks  that  have  granted  debt  service  relief.  This  amount  is  in  no  year  to
exceed  3%  of  the  nominal  value  of  the  debt  exchanged  for  these  bonds  at the  time
of  the  exchange  (i.e.  there  is  no indexation  of this  cap).  The  amount  available
under  this  cleuse  will  be  scaled  back  by  the  percentage  of  the  total  debt  brought
under  the  two  debt  relief  options.
The  value  at  the  maturity  dates  of the  recapture  clause  depends  therefore
on  the  following  three  variables:  oil  export  quantity,  oil  price  behavior-which
determine  Mexico's  oil earnings  and, together  with other capital  flows,  the
12In  the  application  for  Venezuela  we found  that the  valie  of the  end  of
period  price  option  was slightly  higher  than the  value of the  average  price
option.9
amount of foreign exchange available to service the recapture clause-and  the
behavior of inflation rates--which determine the nominal exercise prices. To
determine the current value of the recapture clause, we need to assess  the
characteristics  of the stochastic  process governing  oil exports,  oil prices and
the inflation rate used for adjusting the recapture  clause strike price. It is
projected that the  quantity  of oil  produced  by Mexico will remain  at its  current
level  over the  near future (1.2  million  barrels  per  day, and  will decrease  in the
late 1990s (to 0.8 million barrels a day). Little uncertainty exists regarding
the projections of oil quantities exported given the long lead times from oil
discovery to oil exploration and exportation, and the fact that no new oil
resources are expected to be found. 
1 3 /
The main uncertainty is introduced through the oil price. The standard
deviation  of the  average  price  of  Mexican  oil over  the last  8  years has  been 23%.
Similar  standard deviations have  been  observed  for prices  that  are  close
substitutes of Mexican oil, such as E)rneo light (25% over 87-69), and for the
average  OPEC oil  price (40%  over 87-89,  21%  over 85-89). The standard  deviation
of the  annual changes in  most (nominal)  oil price:,  over the  period 1975-1988  has
been at least 20% annually. Correcting for any trend in oil prices does not
change these estimates significantly and ;;he  lower  bound remains 20%.
The  historical  estimate  of  the  standard  deviation  assumes  that  the
underlying stochastic  process is expected to  be the same in the future.  Another
way to get an estimate of the expected standard deviation is to use market
information, such as actual market prices of oil options which are exercisable
at a particular maturity date, to derive expected standard deviations. Given a
pricing model,  observed option prices can be  used  to back  out  the market
expectation  of the (average)  volatility  over the time  horizon up to the  exercise
dates  that is consistent with  those prices. Doing that one finds that the
historical  estimates  of the  standard  deviation  of  oil  prices  are in  line  with the
market expectations o. future volatilities  as implied  by the prices of options
on oil traded  on exchanges. Using for instance  the  Black and Scholes formula  on
recent oil option contracts results in implied volatili-ies for 1 to 2 year
maturities of around 20%.  Since historical values for the volatility of oil
prices  approximate  closely  the  market's  assessment  of future  volatility,  we used
the historical volatility in our pricing exercises.
The third  element of  uncertainty  is the inflation  rate  used to convert  the
nominal oil  prices into real  prices as the trigger  for the recapture  is defined
in real terms (but the cap is in nominal terms).  One way to deal with the fact
that the triggers are in real terms is to stf  the formula for the recapture
clauses in nominal terms.  This implies that  the exercise  prices L and U .ill  be
13Furthermore,  there  does  not  appear  to  be a  serious  incentive  problem--  the
possibility  that  Mexico is  tempted  to reduce  oil  exports  or exploration --  since
the  share of  exports  earnings  going  to  creditors  will  remain  small  and  since  most
of the investment to generate the earnings  has already occurred.  The amount of
foreign  exchange  available  is  as  such  a  non-traded  asset.  However,  because it  can
easily  be replicated throu,  i a portfolio  of oil-price  sensitive  assets (say  oil
futures) and fixed-income securities  which are traded,  we are allowed to treat
it as a traded asset.10
stochastic and results in call pricing  formulas which  are similar to those
derived by Fischer (1978) and Margrabe (1978).  It is  easy to show that this is
equivalent to expressing the recapture  clause complete in real terms and using
the  real  oil  price  behavior  as the  relevant  underlying  state  vari2 le.  Given  that
the  uncertainty in the nominal oil  price behavior  has been significantly  higher
than the uncertainty in the  inflation rate over the last decade, i.e. the
uncertainty in the real  oil price has been of the same order as the  uncertainty
in the  nominal oil  price,  we considered  that  for  practical  purposes little  value
was added by  introducing inflation uncertainty.14/  We  used therefore simple
projections of inflation rates.' 5 /
There is an additional element of risk to the recapture clause. It is
conceivable  that  the  recapture  clause  is  "in  the  money"  when  Mexico's  net foreign
exchange  available is  only sufficient  to  service  all  official  sector,  bonds, and
(restructured)  commercial  banks  claims,  but  not  the  recapture  clause. After  all,
the resources available to pay out on the recapture clauses will be determined
after  all  other creditors  and (restructured)  commercial  debt is  serviced  and the
recapture  clause does not stipulate what happens if resources fall short. This
problem  can  be  corrected  by  calculating  the  amount  necessary  to  service
commercial bank and other claims, converting this into a minimum oil price
necessary to generate that amount of foreign  xchange, and i.nposing  this as
another lower  bound on the recapture clause through a call option.  16/
The value of the recapture clause per unit of debt also depends on the
amount  of  debt  converted:  we  use the  actual  amount  converted  under the  agreement:
$49 billion.
Using the above set of conditions and parameters, we can calculate the
current value of the recapture clause. As our "base case" we use a standard
deviation  of the  oil  price  which increases  over time  with the  square root  of time
(as  if the oil price  where a lognormal  process over time). i.e.,  at  =  ao*.t.  The
first  year standard deviation'  was chosen as 20%. The drift in the oil price was
set equal to the inflation  forecast,  which was 5 percent, so that the real oil
price  was expected  to  remain  constant.  The  recapture  clause  was assumed to  become
indexed at a starting (real)  oil price of $14 per barrel (the  average price in
14The  standard deviation of the logarithm  of the  nominal price of Mexico's
oil deflated by  the U.S. price index over the last 8 years was 1,8%.  After
correcting for time trend the standard deviation  was 18%.
15In practice, we projected the drift in the real oil price.
16Let N be the amount of foreign exchange for which the (new) commercial
bank claims can just  be serviced  after all other claims  are serviced.  Under the
assumption that the total amount that can be repaid under the clause remains
capped at  M, the recapture  clause can be represented  as: E,->,  a*(max[FX{7.)-D,O]
- max[FX{,,-U',O]),  where D =  max(L,N),  which is  non-stochastic,  and  U' =  D+M/a.
Alternative, the recapture clause may only pay out up to the original maximum
amount of foreign exchange,  U, in  which case the clause can be represented as
Z,.,,  a*(max[FXf,,l-D,0]  - ma-.[FX(,.)-U,O]).  and the maximum payment  will be M-(D-
L).11
1989).  The  value  for the  recapture  clause  (per  unit of converted  debt)  which
resulted  turned  out to oe 1.93  cents,  or less  than  one-eights  of the  present
value  of the  maximum  c-atractually  possible  payments. 17/
One disadvantage  of the lognormal  distribution  is that for long time
horizons  this  leads  to  very  "fat"  tails  in  the  probability  density  of the  price,
something  may  drive  the  results  too  much. 18/ It  is  analytically  unclear  what  the
effect  of a high standard  deviation  of oil prices is on the value of the
recapture  clause  since  the  value  is  the  difference  between  the  values  of  two  call
options,  options  which  are  both increasing  functions  of  the  standard  deviation.
Whether the difference  increases  or decreases  when the standard  deviation
increases  depends  on the  exact  value  of the  parameters.
To check the sensitivity  of the  value of the recapture  clause  to the
standard  deviation  of the  oil price,  we used different  assumptions  about  the
behavior  of the  star.dard  deviation  of the  oil  price  over time.  The base  case
assumed-in line  with  the  lognormality  assumption-that  the  standard  deviation
increased  with the  square  root  of time,  i.e  at  - aolt.  As an alternative,  we
first  assumed  that  a2t  increases  with  the  square  root  of  time  (i.e.,  a2  t  - c2
0,t),
implying  that  the  standard  deviation  increased  less  fast  over  time  as  under  the
base case.  Other  paramete7s  remained  as in the  base case.  The value of the
recapture  clause  increased  in  that  case  from  1.93  cents  to 3  cents.  Evidently,
a decrease  in  uncertainty  increased  the  value.  Second,  it  was  assumed  that  the
standard  deviation  remained  constant  over  time  at  ao.  In  that  case,  the  value  of
the  recapture  clause  rose  further  to  4.5  cents.  Third,  we used  different  values
for  ao. The  results  were  similar  in  that  the  values  of  the  recapture  clause  rose
when  0 a  fell.  All these  sensitivity  analyses  indicate  that  the  assumption  of a
lognormal  distribution  for  the  oil,  price  does  not  lead  to  an  overvaluation  of  the
recapture  clause.  If  anything,  the  recapture  clause  is  undervalued  if  a  lognormal
distribution  is  assumed  instead  of a  stationary  distribution.
A  second  round  of sensitivity  scenarios  centered  on the  drift  of the  real
oil  price,  i.e.  the  drift  in  the  oil  price  relative  to  the  drift  in  the  inflation
rate.  The  base  case  assume  that  the  real  oil  price  remained  constant,  i.e.  that
the  convenience  yield  was  equal  to the  real  interest  rate.  Assuming,  instead  of
a flat  real  oil  price,  an  annual  one  percent  increase  in  the  real  oil  price,  led
to  the  result  that  the  value  of the  recapture  clause  increased  marginally,  from
1.92  cents  to  2.12  cents.
A last  round  of sensitivity  analysis  centered  on  different  values  for  the
first  year  oil  price. 19/ The  base  case  assumid  a first  year  price  of 14  dollar
17As  a  comparison,  the  market  value  of the  Mexico  debt  restructuring  bonds
in  February  1990  was  around  40 cents  (on  a  old  face  value  of  1  dollar),  implying
that  the  recapture  clause  represented  around  5%  of the  value.
18It is  arguable  that  oil  prices  are  more  bounded  and  follow  for instance
a mean-reverting  process.
l9The  exercise  price  is based  on Mexico's  oil earnings  over the last  12
months  and  thus  depends  on the  average  oil  price  over  the  last  12  months.12
a barrel.  Changing  this from  14 to 16 dollar  hardly  changed  the  value  of the
recapture  clause.
IV.  The 1990  Venezuela  Recagture  Clause
The  1990  Venlezuela  agreement  includes  a  recapture  clause  which  is  similar
to the  one in the  1989  Mexico  agreement.  The exact  formulation  is  as follows.
Those  banks  choosing  to convert  their  debt to defeased  par  bonds  and  defeased
principal  discount  bonds  (two  of the  five  debt  reduction  options)  will receive
for  every  $1000  dollar  of face  value  of debt  exchanged  five  (fully  detachable)
warrants.  Each of these  warrants  provides  for  payments  by Venezuela,  at each
semi-annual  interest  payment  on the  bonds,  beginning  at the  12th  and  ending  at
the last (60th)  interest  payment,  if the average  price of oil exported  by
Venezuela  during  the  preceding  six  months,  exceeds  the  strike  price.  The  strike
price  for  the  first  date  is  set  at  U.S.  $20.50  multiplied  by (1.02)12.  The  next
(48)  strike  prices  will  be adjusted  by the  U.S.  producer  price  index.  Payments
will equal  the  difference  between  the  average  oil  price  and the  strike  price,
subject  to  an ceiling  of $3  per  warrant.
The  main  difference  with  the  Mexico  recapture  clause  is that  Venezuela's
export  volume  does not play a role for the  pricing  as the underlying  state
variable  is  the  average  price  of  oil  and  not  the  (average)  oil  exports  earnings.
The  stochastic  process  of  the  oil  price  is  assumed  to  be the  same  as for  Mexico.
The  base case  therefore  used  an expected  annual  standard  deviation  of the  oil
price  of 20  percent  and  no expected  annual  drift  in  the  real  oil  price,  which,
as  shown,  are  fairly  conservative  parameters.  Other  inputs  were  the  following.
The spot  price  of Venezuela's  exports  of oil was around  $16 per barrel.  The
interest  rate used was 10 percent  and the assumption  for the rate of U.S.
producer  price  inflation  was set  to  4 percent.
This set of inputs  and  assumptions  leads  to a base case price  for one
warrant  of $6.6  dollars,  or for  5  warrants  and  expressed  in  cents  per  dollar  of
face  value  of new  debt,  3.3  cents.  To put  this  in  perspective,  we can  compare
this  to the  ceiling  payments  of  $3 over  the  period  from  the  12th  till  the  last
interest  payment  date.  The  present  value  of  this  series  is  $30  dollar  per  warrant
or  15  cents  per  $1  of  converted  debt,  implying  that  the  recapture  clause  is  worth
less  than  one-quarter  of the  contractual  maximum  present  value  possible.
As in the case of Mexico,  the value  of the recovery  clause  is likely
sensitive  with  respect  to  the  following  three  parameters:  the  expected  standard
deviation  of the  oil  price,  the  drift  in the  real  oil  price,  and,  of  course  the
interest  rate  used.  The  sensitivity  of  the  value  (in  cents)  with  respect  to  the
standard  deviation  is shown  in figure  2.  Interesting  here is that the  value
never  exceeds  3.3  cents  and  that  reaches  this  maximum  of 3.3  cent  for  a  standard
deviation  between  20-25  percent.  The  "fatter"  tails  of  the  lognormal  distribution
evidently  do not  lead  to  an  overestimation  of the  price.
To check  the  sensitivity  with respect  to the  other  parameters  some  more
simulation  were  performed.  The following  ranges  of the  other  parameters  led  to
prices  that  were between  2 and  4 cents  per dollar  of face  value  of new debt:
interest  rates  between  8.5  percent  and  14  percent;  current  oil  prices  between  $13
and $18;  producer  inflation  rates  between  2 percent  and 8 percent;  and  annual13
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drifts  in  the  real  oil  price  between  -1.75  percent  and  0.85  percent.  On  the  basis
of these  sensitivities  and  ranges  for  parameters,  the  base  price  of 3.3  cents
seems  a fairly  robust  figure.
Conclusions
This  paper  has  derived  closed  form  solutions  for  the  pricing  of  options  on
average  prices  and recapture  clauses.  On this  basis,  the  values  of recapture
clauses  in the  Mexico  and Venezuela  agreements  under  alternative  assumptions
regarding  the state  variable  underlying  the  clauses  are estimated.  The paper
shows  that  the  sensitivity  of the  values  of the  recapture  clauses  with  respect
to  the  stochastic  process  of  the  underlying  variable  is  different  than  expected.
The  more  "stationary"  the  process  driving  the  underlying  variable  becomes,  the
more  valuable  the  recapture  clause  becomes.  The  reason  is  that  the  effect  of  an
increasing  variance  on  the  value  of  the  recapture  clauses  is  analytically  unclear
since  in  the  two  agreement  the  clauses  are "collars",  bounded  above  and  below.
Only in the empirical  application  could  we find  that increasing  the  variance
reduces  the  value  of the  collar.14
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